

First-Person Science of Consciousness

Theories, Methods, Applications

23.05. - 25.05.2019

University of Witten/Herdecke



Organizers:

Prof. Ulrich Weger, PhD

PD Dr. Christian Tewes

Prof. Dr. Johannes Wagemann

Dr. Terje Sparby

Local Co-organizers:

Prof. Dr. med. Friedrich Edelhäuser

Dr. Anna-Lena Lumma

First-Person Science of Consciousness

Dear Conference Participants,

A very warm welcome to this year's *First-Person Science of Consciousness* conference! We hope you had a good journey here to Witten – especially those coming from further afield (such as Australia, Brazil, Israel and the USA). We are pleased to bring this conference schedule to your attention – with an overview over the 7 keynote lectures, the 16 talks, and the poster presentations taking place during these two and a half days. We are very excited about the range of contributions and look forward to a promising program. You will also find short biographical sketches at the end of this brochure.

On Thursday evening there will be a spring concert by Helge Antoni – a professional pianist. Friday afternoon at 17:15 there will be an *Impulses and Initiatives Forum* where we hope to bring together ideas for a further development of the field – including a discussion of a possible continuation of this conference – perhaps at some other location; suggestions are most welcome. Following supper, Friday evening is an open space for private arrangement – we have included a list of events, restaurants and snack-bars in and around Witten for your convenience. We are in the midst of the Ruhr Valley: an industrial landscape that also has green spots – you only need to know where they are. On page 38 we have included a small map of the area around the University so that you can find quiet outdoor places for walking in between talks and engage in other, alternative approaches to a first-person science of consciousness.

We are delighted to have you here! We look forward to getting to know you and your work and hope you will have a pleasant time in Witten. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact any one of the organizers or the student supporters.

With best wishes – on behalf of the conference team:

Organizers:

Prof. Ulrich Weger, PhD, PD Dr. Christian Tewes, Prof. Dr. Johannes Wagemann, and Dr. Terje Sparby

Local Co-Organizers:

Prof. Dr. med. Friedrich Edelhäuser and Dr. Anna-Lena Lumma

Support Team:

Kurt Mathisen, Sophie Gröning, and Pia Röttler

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Background

The idea of directing attention toward one's own mental acts and their contents exemplifies the ancient philosophical principal of "know thyself" in the context of our modern time. For philosophers like Brentano or Husserl, the observation of often unnoticed pre-reflexive mental phenomena opened up a field for investigating the structure and dynamics of the mind "from within". Corresponding theories and methods were suggested to provide a direct access to the most fundamental aspects of reality – the self, the structure of consciousness, the basic categories of reality, and their logical and ontological foundations.

The various attempts in the early 1900s at establishing a systematic form of introspection in psychology – for instance, in the work of Wundt and Titchener – are regarded as having failed. And though the work of Brentano and Husserl has been influential, actual introspective or phenomenological studies are rare today and typically met with skepticism. Similarly, methods such as phenomenological psychology and micro-phenomenology exist within a niche and are not yet widely regarded as reliable first-person approaches. Hence, a first-person science of consciousness is currently not part of the established forms of systematic, scientific procedure. This is striking, given the fact that first-person observation is implicitly involved in all forms of psychological research. Every psychologist makes direct or indirect use of introspection, for instance, when operationalizing psychological phenomena for further research. One can also argue that precise sense-based observation is inherently introspective, in that it involves mental faculties such as attention and memory.

Furthermore, we take for granted that science benefits from developing ever more precise instruments for investigating natural phenomena. Why should we not develop ever more precise methods for studying consciousness and the introspective activity that underlies scientific conduct? Until we have good methods for gathering accurate, reliable and rich descriptions of mental events and processes, psychology and related disciplines will arguably lack a strong foundation.

Timetable

Thursday, May 23rd

14:00, Audimax	Welcome by the organizers & introduction to the conference theme Prof. Ulrich Weger, PhD & PD Dr. Christian Tewes	
14:30 Audimax	Keynote 1 <i>Why there is no zero-point in the first-person: The phenomenological situation</i> Prof. Shaun Gallagher, PhD	
15:15	Talk 1, E.109 <i>Using 1st person data to explore the psychological assessment of time perception</i> Dr. Katrin Heimann & Federica Cavaletti	Talk 2, E.110 <i>What are we doing when introspecting judgment and decision-making? First-person perspective to preference formation</i> Tuomas Leisti
16:00	Talk 3, E.109 <i>Dancing the neurophenomenological dance: An investigation into the flexibility of minimal selfhood</i> Dr. Fynn Mathis Trautwein & Ohad Nave	Talk 4, E.110 <i>Neuronal and phenomenological correlates of mindfulness meditation and hypnosis</i> Dr. Prisca Bauer
16:45, Foyer	Coffee Break	
17:15, Audimax	Keynote 2 <i>Exploring pristine inner experience</i> Prof. Russell Hurlburt, PhD	
18:00, Foyer	Dinner	
20:00, Foyer	Artistic Performance <i>"To the Spring"</i> Helge Antoni, Pianist	

Friday, May 24th

09:00, Audimax	Keynote 3	
	<i>The Phenomenology and metaphysics of the attitudes</i> Prof. Michelle Montague, PhD	
09:45	Talk 5, E.109	Talk 6, E.110
	<i>Novel Empirical Approaches for Phenomenological Psychology</i> Alexander Wendt	<i>The study of experience: methods, challenges, limits and possibilities</i> Dr. Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky
10:30, Foyer	Coffee Break	
11:00, Audimax	Keynote 4	
	<i>Improving the Reliability of the Introspective Approach - Meditation Expertise as Research Method</i> Prof. Dr. Stefan Schmidt	
11:45	Talk 7, E.109	Talk 8, E.110
	<i>Self and Sense of Self. Why the Feeling of Being Someone Cannot be a Hallucination</i> Philipp Schmidt	<i>Developing a short-term phenomenological training program: A report of methodological lessons</i> Dr. Katsunori Miyahara
12:30, Foyer	Lunch	
13:30, Foyer	Poster Session	
14:30, Audimax	Keynote 5	
	<i>Exploring Mental Micro Gestures in Perceptual Reversals – Implications for the Mind-Brain-Problem</i> Prof. Dr. Johannes Wagemann	
15:15	Talk 9, E.109	Talk 10, E.110
	<i>The horizons of becoming aware</i> Prof. Dr. Urban Kordeš	<i>An experimental phenomenology on binocular rivalry</i> Dr. Takuya Niikawa
16:00, Foyer	Coffee Break	
16:30	Talk 11, E.109	Talk 12, E.110
	<i>First-person« clinical approach and »first-person« empirical research methodologies in psychoanalysis</i> Uni.-Prof. Dr. habil. Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch	<i>Classifying Adolescent Depression from Within: Varieties of Depressive Experience in Youths Exhibiting Different Levels of Psychic Structural Integration</i> Dr. Andrés Sánchez Guerrero
17:15, Audimax	Perspectives & Impulses	
	Prof. Ulrich Weger, PhD & Dr. Terje Sparby	
18:00, Foyer	Dinner	

Saturday, May 25th

09:00, Audimax

Keynote6

Some peculiarities of the first-person experience of thinking; or: How can Husserl's phenomenology be epistemology if there is a 'veritable abyss' between consciousness and reality?

Dr. Christopher Gutland

09:45

Talk 13, E.109

Microphenomenology and Abduction
Ole Höffken

Talk 14, E.110

Applying the scientific method directly to the mind – On the feasibility, necessary prerequisites and practical implementation of a first-person science

Nicolas Endres

10:30, Foyer

Coffee Break

11:00

Talk 15, E.109

How does the exploration of consciousness and awareness serve people who experience seizures?

Dr. Rosa Michaelis

Talk 16, E.110

Awake in dreamless sleep: the case of lucid dreamless sleep

Adriana Alcaraz

11:45, Audimax

Keynote 7

Describing the experience of conscious, occurrent thinking: A first and second-person approach

Dr. Fergus Anderson

12:30, Audimax

Conclusion

Abstracts

May 23rd, 2019

Keynote 1

14:30, Audimax

Why there is no zero-point in the first-person perspective: A phenomenological notion of the agentive situation

Shaun Gallagher



Husserl and a number of phenomenologists have often used the term ‘zero-point’ to signify the bodily origin of the first-person perspective; likewise one can think of this idea as implicit to discussions of the egocentric spatial frame of reference. Studies of embodied cognition, however, suggest that there is no zero-point, that body-schematic processes are “thick” or dimensional with varying perspectives relative to different parts of the body. I will argue that we can flesh out this view by considering the notion of agentive situation, derived from John Dewey’s notion of a situation that includes the first-person agent.

Talk 1

15:15, E.109

Using 1st person data to explore the psychological assessment of time perception

Katrin Heimann & Federica Cavaletti

How we perceive time has been a continuous question within various disciplines from the earliest beginning of research on (see for example Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14), and certainly a big topic within phenomenology (see Husserl, Zur Phaenomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins). As early as the beginning of the last century, it has also been noted that a number of psychiatric pathologies come with a changed sense of time (Straus 1928; Minkowski 1970, Fuchs 2001, 2013; Ratcliffe 2012, 2015). This has lately led research, specifically in psychology, psychiatry and cognitive science, to develop and rely on tests allowing for the detection of respective deviations—not only in the clinical sector. Reacting to the fact that studies using these tests did not lead to univocal results, however, it has recently been claimed that such measurement tools have not been properly evaluated with regard to what they actually assess and are likely used in inadequate if not misleading ways (Thönesand Oberfeld 2015, Cavaletti & Heimann, 2019). Picking up on these claims, we designed a new study imitating the precise setup of a recent publication (Eugeni, Cavaletti et al, inreivision) using such tests. Participants were asked to watch a short movie and then to answer two questions (counterbalanced order) with the help of a likert scale: a) How much time (in seconds) do you think the video clip lasted (regular duration estimation measurement); b) How fast or slow did time pass for you while watching the video clip (regular time passage perception measurement). The only important deviation within our design consisted in additionally conducting a micro-phenomenological interview with the participants after the first as well as the second trial of the experiment, focusing on how they responded to the tasks in focus. Our talk will discuss the results of pilot recordings with 13 participants touching upon a) the differences regarding the experiential process reported between the two tasks, b) the differences regarding the experiential process reported between trial 1 and 2 as well as the challenges encountered when using MP in this setup to explore time perception.

Talk 2

15:15, E.110

What are we doing when introspecting judgment and decision-making?

First-person perspective to preference formation

Tuomas Leisti

Earlier, the prevailing paradigm in decision science regarded rational decision-making processes as explicit, algorithmic and serial, locating them in conscious thought. Controlled think-aloud methodologies were created to reveal these processes. While rational decision-making was identified with conscious thought, biases were attributed to intuition, that is, to automatic and non-conscious processes. In this framework, subjective experience and subjective explanations were treated with suspicion and were mostly neglected in research, associating them with the non-rational domain of the human mind. Certain studies also indicated these explanations to be contaminated with interpretations and theorizing, fixing the possible gaps when constructing a mental narrative of the decision process. Subjective experience, in particular, was seen as vulnerable to such fabrication, because subjective phenomena can be difficult to verbalize, or the underlying processes can be inaccessible to conscious thought.

Psychological decision science, however, has faced a paradigm shift in recent years, increasing attention towards the adaptive role of the fast and efficient non-conscious processes, undermining the rationale of the think-aloud methodology. This paradigm assumes that most decisions are based on processes that automatically integrate information of the alternatives. This integration occurs outside conscious access, but processes distribute their results in phenomenal consciousness as impressions, feelings or percepts, for instance.

The recent development has increased skepticism towards the methods relying on research participants' verbalizations. In this presentation, I would like to make an opposite conclusion: the new emphasis on intuition requires more attention towards subjective experience and towards subjective explanations, or introspection. Subjective experience is important due to its role as an intermediate phase, which interprets the available information from the first-person viewpoint before the actual voluntary choice. Due to this personal interpretation, the underlying decision process cannot be constructed on the basis of objective data about the stimuli, as this interpretation is influenced by personal factors not controlled in experimental setting. The research participant may not be aware of these factors, but the experience descriptions can unveil them through interpretations.

My suggestion is also that introspection is not necessarily an artificial task requirement, posed by an experimenter to the research participant, but a relevant reflective part of the decision-making when people need to either employ their explicit knowledge or share their knowledge with others. We regard this kind of introspective data as social metacognition, which enables distributing, sharing and learning knowledge about the grounds of decisions in different cases.

Talk 3

16:00, E.109

Dancing the neurophenomenological dance: An investigation into the flexibility of minimal selfhood

Fynn-Mathis Trautwein & Ohad Nave

Ordinary conscious experience is characterized by a prereflective sense of “I-ness”, often termed the “minimal self”, comprising features such as a body-centered perspective onto the world, a feeling of ownership of the body, and a sense of agency. In this talk, we suggest that a neurophenomenological investigation of meditative experience can provide important insights into the structure and dynamics of minimal selfhood.

This idea is based on foregoing studies (Ataria et al., 2015, Consciousness and Cognition; Dor-Ziderman et al., 2016, Neuroscience of Consciousness) that yielded first phenomenological descriptions as well as neurophysiological correlates of certain meditative states characterized by pronounced alteration and sometimes a complete lack of several features of the minimal self. Within a larger ongoing study with long-term meditators, we aim to narrow down the phenomenological invariants and dynamics of these experiences. At the same time, we are zooming in onto candidate neural processes that might correspond to this phenomenology, including interoceptive monitoring, action based sensory suppression and multimodal integration in peripersonal space.

The presented research program exemplifies how phenomenological and neural description and analysis can, in “dancing the neurophenomenological dance”, mutually enlighten each other. Such mutual enlightenment, or mutual constraints, can operate on several levels. From a broader perspective, the meditative (phenomenological) investigation brings to center-stage pre-reflective experiential phenomena and their flexibility, while qualitative interview methods can further unfold and uncover structure and dynamics of experience. Such insights gained from the first-person perspective can direct the employment of experimental neuroscientific setups and analysis techniques. On a more fine-grained level, phenomenological reports allow us to organize data according to phenomenological categories, and to constrain data analysis to relevant epochs. In turn, the (neuro) scientific description highlights how the experience of minimal selfhood - experiencing one’s being as a bounded entity separate from the world - constantly arises through specific cognitive and bodily processes. Moreover, these insights highlight the utility of combining phenomenology, intense contemplative training and electrophysiological neuroimaging for characterizing the minimal self.

Talk 4

16:00, E.110

Neuronal and phenomenological correlates of mindfulness meditation and hypnosis

Prisca Bauer

Background: Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are increasingly used to improve mental health. The hypnotic state is characterized by absorption, suggestibility and reduction of self-consciousness. Mindfulness meditation, aims, amongst other things, at strengthening meta-awareness.

Objective: Despite the increasing popularity of mindfulness and hypnosis in healthcare and in the general community the underlying neuropsychological mechanisms are unclear. The change in the relationship between the self and the conscious experience that they bring about may be crucial. Studying such states, their associated changes in subjective experience and corresponding neural correlates is challenging and requires an accurate description of the experience. I will report on a study that aims at identifying the phenomenological and neural correlates of self-consciousness in meta-awareness and absorption, and highlight the challenges in linking subjective experiences with neural and behavioral correlates.

Methods: We used three standardized audio instructions of 17 minutes each in randomized order to modify the conscious state of participants: 1) mind wandering 2) raising awareness of conscious processes and re-focusing on the body and the breath (meta-awareness) 3) multi-sensory re-experiencing of a nice place (absorption). First-person experiences were assessed using likert scales and interviews. To study the neural correlates of these states, the experiment was repeated in a subgroup during functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scanning, and in patients with intracranial electrodes (iEEG) for clinical monitoring. Both were also combined with first-person experiential accounts.

Results: Hundred healthy participants completed the first part of the study, of which forty participated in the fMRI experiment. Five patients with intracranial electrodes were recorded so far. Qualitative analysis of interviews shows that the first-person experience is highly variable. In addition, experiences reported in the interviews are often discordant with Likert scale ratings, raising questions on how to accurately access the first-person experience in experimental settings. To conclude I will provide some preliminary examples on how first-person data can help guide and interpret the analysis of fMRI and iEEG data.

Conclusion: This study sheds light on the value and challenges in assessing first-person experience in altered states of consciousness.

Keynote 2

17:15, Audimax

Exploring pristine inner experience

Russell T. Hurlburt



By “inner experience” I mean directly apprehended (“before the footlights of consciousness”) phenomena such as inner seeing, inner speaking, an itch, a smell, and so on. By “pristine inner experience” I mean naturally occurring inner experience, undisturbed by an experimenter’s manipulation or the participant’s explicit intention to introspect. I have, for 40+ years, been using descriptive experience sampling (DES) in the attempt to apprehend pristine inner experience. Of course, that attempt falls short, because even a DES beeper-cued introspective attempt disturbs the pristineness of experience, but I would argue that much of interest can still be apprehended. In this conversation I will respond to the interests of the participants. I could discuss methodological issues (Why use a beep? Is iteration essential? Can presuppositions be bracketed? What is the role of language? What do participants mean by “I think”? Etc.). Or I could discuss some results (Is their unsymbolized thinking? What are characteristics of experience in adolescents? In the elderly? In schizophrenia? In Asperger Syndrome? Is there perception without figure/ground phenomena? Etc.) You choose.

Artistic Performance

20.00, Foyer

“To the Spring”

Helge Antoni, Pianist

“A day in May is a categorical imperative of joy” – Friedrich Hebbel (1813-1863)

The Swedish pianist Helge Antoni showcases his romantic program as he returns to his Scandinavian roots to play Christian Sinding’s “Rustle of Spring” and Edvard Grieg’s “To the Spring” that wonderfully channel the arrival of Spring in the far north. Antoni will also feature Grieg’s famous “Holberg Suite” in its original version for the piano as well as a selection of “Lyric Pieces”

May 24th, 2019

Keynote 3

9:00, Audimax

The Phenomenology and metaphysics of the attitudes

Michelle Montague, PhD



Ignoring first-person access to the phenomenological character of our conscious intentional mental states is apt to lead to certain errors regarding the metaphysics of the attitudes. It has long been standard practice in analytic philosophy to describe conscious intentional mental states in terms of three distinct metaphysical elements: a subject-element, an attitude-element, and a content-element. I call it 'the Tripartite view', because it posits three fundamental distinct elements. In this paper I argue that the Tripartite view is mistaken and propose that it should be replaced by what I will call 'the Dual view'. According to the Dual view, all there is to the metaphysics of our intentional states is (i) a content and (ii) a subject; there is no need to postulate distinct metaphysical relations and call them 'the belief relation', 'the desire relation', and so on. I will argue the metaphysics of the Dual view is harmonious with how we experience intentional mental states in the stream of consciousness, in a way that the Tripartite view is not.

Talk 5

9:45, E.109

Novel Empirical Approaches for Phenomenological Psychology

Alexander Wendt

The 1960s brought heydays for Phenomenological Psychology, spawning three regional approaches in Utrecht, Heidelberg, and Pittsburgh. Ever since, these approaches have either ceased to exist, like the Utrecht school, or relapsed into maverick status. Retrospectively, the 'phenomenological orientation in psychology' was not prepared to accommodate to the mainly quantitative demands of the cognitive revolution. On the contrary, the formation of Phenomenological Psychology depended on the vestiges of pre-war traditions of thought. A truly self-sustaining approach has to set aside the burdens of tradition and venture into rejuvenation. The idea of a rejuvenation of Phenomenological Psychology comes with the necessity of novel approaches, such as a response to the statistical emphasis of contemporary psychology. Thus, a program for rejuvenation is proposed. Furthermore, it is paramount to engage with contemporary psychology's experimental procedures. Drawing on an example from problem solving research, the potentialities of rejuvenated Phenomenological Psychology can be outlined. As a conceptually enriched investigation method, pseudo-interactivity allows to study aspects of behavior that remain unattainable for a purely cognitivist psychology.

Talk 6

9:45, E.110

The study of experience: methods, challenges, limits and possibilities

Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky

The development of first-person methodologies has revealed conceptual, methodological and epistemological challenges. Taking as a reference frame the use of a specific first-person methodology, called micro-phenomenology, the aim of this talk is to discuss some of such challenges organizing them around three axes.

The first axis, called *the notion of experience*, refers to the challenge posed by the fact that the notions of experience and subjectivity have different meanings and connotations according to the discipline or context in which they are used. What do we mean when we refer to the notion of experience in the context of first-person methodologies? In the context of the development of a first-person science of

consciousness, this question has rather practical and pivotal implications: defining the type of accounts that will be considered as experiential descriptions and subsequently, defining the criteria to assess the quality of first-person research.

The second axis, called *the notion of memory*, refers to the fact that any methodology that studies experience has to face the challenge that experience is always described in retrospect. One of the criticisms made against the first-person approaches is that we cannot access our past experiences with precision and that it is very likely that we conjure up false memories. However, the notion of memory that underlies such criticism assumes that our memory is a storage-retrieval mechanism that should be able to access items stored in the past with no variations. How do we understand the notion of memory in first-person research?

The third one, called *the issue of language*, refers to the challenge posed by the fact that first-person methods mainly rely on verbal descriptions. Although we take every precaution to obtain a description of quality, we still come across the problem that verbal descriptions might not be able to fully convey the experience under study. Can expressive practices serve as tools for addressing the non-conceptual dimensions of experience? If so, what would be the epistemological implications of such a claim? What is the difference between expressing, describing and representing one's experience? Does verbalizing entail pigeonholing the experience under study or is it a way of expanding it?

Keynote 4

11:00, Audimax

Improving the Reliability of the Introspective Approach - Meditation Expertise as Research Method

Stefan Schmidt



One possibility to improve reliability of first-person approaches is to work with experienced meditators as participants. Experienced meditators have demonstrated to have more refined interoceptive abilities as well as enhanced capacities in attention regulation. Especially the latter one allows for a more continuous, stable and undistracted observation of internal cognitive processes. Thus, meditation expertise can be applied as research tool. This will be demonstrated by an example of a former Buddhist monk who participated in a set of neurophenomenological experiments on self-initiated action. We used the set-up of the so-called "Libet Experiment" for this approach. The experiment involved the simple process of moving a finger being described repeatedly in detail by him while maintaining an attitude of relaxed observation. In parallel EEG was recorded to align first and third person data. Based on the feedback of EEG data the meditator made slight changes to his behavior, which in turn resulted in different EEG results. By this iterative approach we were able to give an introspective account of action initiation. Moreover, we could demonstrate that a trained meditator can willfully alter the timing and size of the Readiness Potential preceding self-initiated action in the EEG, which has also an impact on the apparent paradox of the Libet experiment.

Talk 7

11:45, E.109

Self and Sense of Self. Why the Feeling of Being Someone Cannot be a Hallucination

Philipp Schmidt

According to Metzinger's *self-model theory of subjectivity* (2003, 2007) there are no such things as selves and our everyday use of the concept of self is unwarranted. While these claims are typical for no-self-views that have been advanced since Hume's seminal introspective analysis of experience, Metzinger's explanation for his refusal of the reality of self is particularly interesting. For, quite unlike his Hume-inspired predecessors, Metzinger does not deny that our experiences are characterized by a basic sense of self. What he denies, however, is that the basic sense of self refers in fact to a self. To substantiate his claim, he offers a reductionist analysis of phenomenal content and what he calls

phenomenal selfhood. This leads him to the claim that all phenomenal content, including our feeling of being someone, is ultimately to be considered as hallucinatory content produced by our brain, the real bearer of experiences. In my talk, I discuss Metzinger's claims and similar suggestions in recent literature, and argue that being a self and having a sense of self are inextricably interwoven. Accordingly, I suggest, once it is accepted that our experiences involve a sense of self, it is impossible to describe phenomenal selfhood as a kind of hallucination or to deny the reality of self. To develop my view, I will draw on Zahavi's account of minimal self and the phenomenological method involved. The heart of my argument is the notion that *being a self* consists essentially in *self-consciousness*. According to the view I propose, it is precisely by being aware of its own experiences that the self exists: self-consciousness, rather than being only the *modus cognoscendi*, is the *modus essendi* of self. Moreover, I will argue that although Metzinger's account presents a fairly detailed introspective analysis of (self-) consciousness, which bears even some resemblance with Zahavi's phenomenology of selfhood, the lack of a clear and careful introspective methodology is what ultimately allows Metzinger to draw his problematic conclusions regarding the self. I contrast Metzinger's introspective methodology with phenomenological methodology implied in Zahavi's minimal self account and argue that the latter is more careful, elaborated, and, therefore, allows more reliable insights into the real nature of phenomenal selfhood. Finally, by discussing the ontological implications of each methodological framework, my aim is to show the need for careful methodological reflection when developing philosophical theories based on introspective data.

Talk 8

11:45, E.110

Developing a short-term phenomenological training program: A report of methodological lessons

Katsunori Miyahara

This talk reports our attempt to develop a short-term phenomenological training program—a procedure to develop phenomenological skills of naïve subjects within the timeframe of a single lab visit. It starts by reviewing existing methodologies for collecting phenomenological data. It identifies four main approaches based on (i) long-term phenomenological training, (ii) short-term phenomenological training, (iii) phenomenological interview, and (iv) psychological questionnaires, and clarifies the benefit of pursuing the second approach. It then introduces our two-staged short-term phenomenological training program, which aims to develop two key skills for phenomenological description: (i) The ability to perform phenomenological epoché or to reorient one's attention towards the experience as such, and (ii) to describe the non-objectual aspects of the experience—that is, aspects that cannot be reduced to features of its intentional object. It contains two stages of training, the illusion training and the guidance training. In the illusion training, the subjects are presented with a geometrical illusion and instructed to describe their visual experience as articulately as possible. To induce an epoché, they are told to describe not what they experience (“intentional object”), but rather how the object appears (“intentional content”), how they are aware of it (“intentional act”), and any other subjective feelings that do not belong to the object (“accompanying feelings”). In the guidance training, the subjects are offered a tutorial to further develop their skills to attend to and describe these non-objectual aspects of the experience. The talk then moves on to report the pilot experiment conducted to test the effectiveness of this two-staged training program. We applied the program to a group of subjects and compared the quality of their phenomenological descriptions produced in three test phases each conducted before, between, and after the two stages of training. The outcome was inconsistent in that only half of the participants improved the targeted skills. The talk concludes by discussing methodological lessons of this experiment for the short-term training paradigm of neurophenomenology. It first points out that the current experiment already shows the possibility of improving phenomenological skills in a very short time period. This means that costly methodologies, like long-term training or phenomenological interviews, are not indispensable for collecting phenomenological data. It then identifies three factors that must be taken into consideration to

improve the short-term training program: (i) Individual difference in phenomenological talent; (ii) Limited transferability of phenomenological skills; (iii) Complications about providing guidance.

Keynote 5

14:30, Audimax

Exploring Mental Micro Gestures in Perceptual Reversals – Implications for the Mind-Brain-Problem

Johannes Wagemann



In view of the hard and, as yet, unresolved problem of mind and brain, new research strategies seem to be needed. Apart from obtaining increasingly accurate neurophysiological data or opening up new (meta) levels of philosophical debate, the constitutive phenomena of consciousness – as one side of the problem – should be explored with an adequate methodological rigor. This requires in particular the advance of experimental research in the field of pre-reflective mental states and actions, which are potentially supposed to play a central role in the constitution of everyday consciousness. In this talk, a structure-phenomenologically inspired first-person approach to mental micro gestures in perceptual reversals is demonstrated in respect of its method and results from an empirical study. From here, indications of a generalizable diachronic basic structure of mental action in perceptive processes emerge, the implications of which for a trans-categorical conception of the mind-brain relation will be outlined.

Talk 9

15:15, E.109

The horizons of becoming aware

Urban Kordeš

The inevitable intrusion of the act of examining into the experience being examined – sometimes referred to as the excavation fallacy – has turned out to be one of the key obstacles in establishing a valid and reliable area of first-person research. Instead of attempting to “solve” or bypass this fundamental feature of the reflective act, we will take it as a building block for establishing an epistemological framework as well as methodological guidelines for empirical investigation of lived experience.

Acknowledging that characteristics of examination of experience form an indivisible aspect of the acquired knowledge reframes our understanding of phenomenal data. Instead of pristine, intact experience, we deal with experience-as-acquired through particular research horizon. Understanding the horizon of reflection has similar role as understanding measurement characteristics in quantum physics, thus becoming an important part of investigation. We will describe some of the methodological consequences of such reframing using examples from our longitudinal research, aiming at exploring meditation as a tool for investigating consciousness.

Talk 10

15:15, E.110

An experimental phenomenology on binocular rivalry

Takuya Niikawa

This talk explores the subjective features of binocular rivalry (BR) by way of evaluating its usefulness in neuroscientific studies on consciousness. We start by explaining why it is important to clarify the subjective features of BR. Existing research on BR typically explores its neural underpinnings, while paying much less attention to its subjective features as if we already had sufficient understanding of the latter. However, the current understanding of the subjective features of BR is inadequate in two respects: (i) It heavily relies on the researchers’ intuition and introspection; no systematic experimental

research into the phenomenology of BR has been conducted to base them; (ii) It is silent on the status of BR-experience in relation to other forms of perceptual experience: it does not clarify whether BR and non-BR forms of perceptual experience belong to the same phenomenological type. This is particularly problematic since BR has been used to study the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness on the assumption that one can generalize findings about BR to explain non-BR forms of perceptual experience. If there were basic phenomenological differences between BR and non-BR experience, they would pose complications to this generalizability assumption. We then introduce our experimental phenomenological study on the subjective features of BR. The experiment proceeded in three stages: (i) Eight phenomenological hypotheses about BR were generated based on the experimenters' own BR-experience; (ii-a) Phenomenological descriptions of BR and FBR (Fake Binocular Rivalry: a visual stimulus that resembles the content of BR-experience) were collected from subjects through second-personal interviews; (ii-b) the subjects answered a questionnaire specifically designed to clarify the subjective features of their BR-experience; (iii) The hypotheses were tested against the phenomenological descriptions and the results of the questionnaire survey. We conclude by reporting the results and discussing their implications for consciousness research. Three hypotheses were confirmed by the experiment: (i) The experiential transition of the perceptual content is spatially and temporally less determinate in BR- than in non-BR experience; (ii) The experiential transition is contingent on attentional changes and eye blinks in BR- but not in non-BR experience; (iii) The experiential content is less unified in BR- than in non-BR experience. These phenomenological differences suggest that BR belongs to a different phenomenological type from many other forms of perceptual experience. This shows that the generalization assumption is much more complicated than it has been thought to be.

Talk 11

16:30, E.109

First-person« clinical approach and »first-person« empirical research methodologies in psychoanalysis

Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch

Current sciences of the mind successfully develop objective, so called »third-person« methodologies to account for general mechanisms of the mind. According to widespread objections to psychoanalysis, it is considered to be a theory of the mind reductive in its account of subjectivity. In my contribution I will show psychoanalysis in a different light. Psychoanalysis considers »first-person« phenomena, namely subjective experience, as a distinctive and therefore non-reducible component of the mind. Therefore, it is able to combine »first-« and »third-person« methods for investigating the mind clinically as well as within its increasingly developing empirical psychoanalytic research.

However, since Freud, psychoanalysis has not only been a theory of the mind and a scientific methodology for investigating mental processes. In its third dimension, psychoanalysis is also a psychotherapy that has been developing its own clinical practices and techniques. Psychoanalysis refers to its »first-person« approach not only as an investigative clinical and empirical method but also as a curative therapy.

Psychoanalysis acquainted us with the insight that something might occur to a subject, and in that sense be subjective and yet not be accessible to her or him. Psychoanalysis differentiates between conscious and non-conscious phenomena and justifies this distinction by maintaining that the subject is not aware of what happened to her or him. But although psychoanalysis questions the »first-person« perspective of patients, and of psychoanalysts too, this perspective is nevertheless absolutely necessary for it as a treatment.

The experience of living subjectivity occurs in the relationship between psychoanalysts and patients.

The psychoanalytic experience is not just a mental one, but rather a psychophysical, embodied experience, which further allows re-establishing contact and continuity between one's own mind and one's own body. While the work of patients is basically to express their free associations, presenting their »first-person« subjectivity, psychoanalysts are in addition required to focus not only on the patient's whole expression (meaning cognitive and emotional, conscious and unconscious, verbal and pre-, para- and nonverbal expressions) of her or his own experiences, but at the same time on their own holistic reaction to the patient, termed countertransference. The countertransference of the analyst is assumed to be the best way to reach the subjective experience of the patient. Psychoanalysts gain the unique opportunity to take part in the living subjective experience of their patients. What patients cannot tell us, they will show us. This experience offered by patients in the analytic session may even be the instantiation in vivo of their very early preverbal past experience.

The contribution will also present a second level of »first-person« knowledge provided by »first-person« methodologies within psychoanalytic empirical research. »First-person« empirical methodologies investigate the self and involve a self-reflective and interpersonal component investigating one's own and others' psychophysical experience.

Talk 12

16:30, E.110

Classifying Adolescent Depression from Within: Varieties of Depressive Experience in Youths Exhibiting Different Levels of Psychic Structural Integration

Andrés Sánchez Guerrero

Mood disorders are among the most frequent psychiatric disorders affecting youths. Existing studies of adolescent depression commonly deal with vulnerability and resilience factors, course of the episodes and the disorder, and effectiveness of psychosocial and therapeutic interventions. Transformations in the subjective qualities of experience during an episode of adolescent depression have not been adequately explored and elucidated. Despite clinically established typologies of depression, the phenomenology of the varieties of depressive experience in adolescence remains vaguely characterized. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose that, depending on the individual's trajectory of personality development, the relevant experiences may vary noticeably, as far as their core thematic qualities are concerned. Whether this is the case remains an open question, though. This contribution presents preliminary results of a phenomenologically grounded, qualitative empirical study that aims at closing this gap.

The study compares reports of adolescents aged 14 to 17 years who have been diagnosed with a clinically significant form of depression at the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry of the University Hospital Münster. These adolescents differ with respect to their level of psychic structural integration, which is taken to indicate the trajectory of their personality development. The compared reports concern the participants' modified world- and self-experiences during an episode of depression. Seeking to differentiate fundamental experiential qualities captured by these accounts, the study explores core themes emerging in the course of a problem-focused interview. This interview is conducted on the basis of a self-developed guide grounded in existing philosophical analyses of depression. Drawing on recent philosophic-phenomenological studies concerning the experiences of adults suffering from depression, the study examines the participants' descriptions with respect to the prevailing "metaphors". After discussing the clinical and theoretical considerations that guide this inquiry as well as certain methodological issues, this contribution discusses the potentiality of an explorative phenomenological analysis to reveal a clinically relevant relationship between certain varieties of depressive experience in adolescence and the level of psychic structural integration of the affected individuals.

May 25th, 2019

Keynote 6

9:00, Audimax

Some peculiarities of the first-person experience of thinking; or: How can Husserl's phenomenology be epistemology if there is a 'veritable abyss' between consciousness and reality?

Christopher Gutland



Husserl's phenomenology is about discovering, experiencing, and describing the essential structures of consciousness based on the experience of them. He believed the world must appear to us within these structures and consequently considered phenomenology to be epistemology. However, although Husserl explicitly rejects Kant's 'things in themselves,' he nonetheless claims a 'veritable abyss' between consciousness and reality. He not only methodologically brackets questions about empirical existence, but in his *Cartesian Meditations* he even claims that the ego, studying its inborn a priori by means of eidetic variation, ultimately frees itself from the ontology of this world, venturing on to discover other possible ontologies. Husserl consequently believed that the ontology of the world we experience must be one of the possible ontologies that phenomenology uncovers. How can we be sure of this, however, if there is a veritable abyss between consciousness and reality? For even a plethora of possible ontologies discoverable within the first-person perspective would not guarantee that the ontology of the actual world is among them. In line with phenomenology's methodical requirement, mere logical arguments are insufficient to solve this dilemma. However, by delving into the experience of thinking, a way out of this dilemma unfolds. For within this experience, it soon becomes evident that there is no fixed a priori innate to subjectivity. Instead, there is a kind of thinking by which we find and then first establish a priori structures in our subjectivity. This kind of thinking is a process where we are, one the one hand, active in constituting the a priori form that is new to us, but on the other hand, passive, in that our subjectivity is affected and altered in this process. This experience thus goes beyond the seemingly incommensurable dichotomy between subjective a priori and objective ontology. It consequently also sheds light on one of the points where the distinction between first-person research and third-person research loses its grip.

Talk 13

9:45, E.109

Microphenomenology and Abduction

Ole Höffken

From the conception of phenomenology by Husserl up to its modern applications, it has been understood as a broadly transcendental undertaking. Phenomenology proceeds by bracketing assumptions about the existence and nature of an objective world (and on experience understood as an occurrence in that world). Structures of experience are then to be elicited reflectively as the necessary conditions of possibility ('transcendental conditions') for object-oriented consciousness in its various forms.

The approach of micro-phenomenology proceeds from the same stance as 'traditional phenomenology', but applies a different methodology: Structures of experience are to be elicited by an iterative process of (1) conducting interviews on singular first-person experiences in a carefully evoked phenomenological attitude and (2) analyzing the findings in a manner liable to intersubjective validation.

In this talk, it is argued that the micro-phenomenological approach with its specific methodological and epistemological profile is actually more amenable to abductive rather than to transcendental reasoning. In modern philosophy, especially in analytic quarters, abduction has been promoted as a viable part of philosophical methodology. In this context, the concept of abduction has broadened

from an 'inference to the best explanation' to a more general tool oriented towards 'theoretical virtues' such as simplicity, generality and coherence. Abduction starts from concrete evidence, with a general openness to what may count as evidence and by which method it is gathered (thus allowing for micro-phenomenological interviews, potentially). It constitutes an explicitly fallible inference method as opposed to deduction that is ultimately (if maybe only ideally) aimed at necessary conclusions (in parallel to transcendental reasoning). This evidence-orientation and fallibilism of abduction fits well with the approach of micro-phenomenology that is pragmatic, bottom-up and cautious to eschew overambitious epistemological demands. Building on this observation, the talk explores an understanding of micro-phenomenology, especially micro-phenomenological analysis, as an abductive process.

Talk 14

9:45, E.110

Applying the scientific method directly to the mind – On the feasibility, necessary prerequisites and practical implementation of a first-person science

Nicolas Endres

At the turn of the 20th century the goal of creating an exact, rigorous introspective science thrived within psychology and phenomenology. Unfortunately, this endeavor was rather short-lived and the introspective approach was soon almost entirely replaced by the behaviorist paradigm. One obstacle for the early introspectionist movement might have been that they did not have the appropriate tools for the systematic observation of and experimentation with mental states.

Now, however, we have access to the various techniques for concentrating, calming and observing the mind derived from ancient wisdom traditions, such as Buddhism. In addition to that, advances in neuroscience now permit us to track functional changes in the brain in real time and to categorize correlates of different mental states. Neuroscientific evidence strongly indicates that mental faculties, such as attention and metacognition, which were previously thought to be more or less fixed, may be greatly enhanced with training.

Rather than having to rely on amateur introspection, we now have the possibility to systematically refine our mental faculties of attention, interoception, mindfulness and metacognition. This might not only allow us to make richer, more fine-grained and more objective observations within subjectivity but it could also ultimately enable us to reliably and systematically induce mental states and to generate insight regarding the general workings of the mind.

An example of this is an EEG/fMRI study by Hagerty et al. (2013) in which they examined an experienced meditator while practicing deep concentration states (jhanas) in which he seems to be able to self-stimulate his reward system. This process can be seen as an experiment conducted entirely within the confines of an individual's mind and body that, nevertheless, reliably produces specific outcomes, observable both from the first-person and third-person perspective. Using this example, I will point out how we may be able to apply the scientific method directly to the mind with the same rigor regarding validity, reliability and objectivity as we already do in third-person science.

Finally, I will discuss some necessary steps toward an implementation of a first-person science. I will emphasize the importance of training the next generation of mind scientists in first-person methodology and briefly describe a pilot study I conducted, teaching an experimental first-person science course at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain at Humboldt University in Berlin.

Talk 15

11:00, E.109

How does the exploration of consciousness and awareness serve people who experience seizures?

Rosa Michaelis

Epilepsy is a serious, common and chronic neurological condition characterized by an increased disposition to experience occasional seizures; it is associated with major comorbidities including mood

disorders and cognitive dysfunction.

Admission to the epilepsy-monitoring unit (EMU) for long-term video electroencephalography (EEG) monitoring constitutes the gold standard for seizure diagnosis and presurgical evaluation. The EEG records the electrical correlates of brain activity, and thus, reflects brain states of arousal and mood, as well as pathological conditions such as epileptic seizures. However, at the level of individual experience the relation between EEG phenomena and subjective ratings of psychological states is poorly examined.

Unpredictability is considered one of the most disabling and frightening aspects of epilepsy, which may even impair quality of life in seizure-free people with epilepsy. The facilitation of seizure prediction and early detection of seizure occurrence might reduce the burden of epilepsy by allowing for targeted patient training in the application of preemptive therapy, abortive and precautionary measures. In addition, this work could improve the understanding of the transitions from interictal to preictal and ictal states. The elicitation interview technique has been used to successfully gain access to the unconscious and pre-reflective experiential dimensions of subjective pre-seizure experience. So far, hypotheses have only been derived from the retrospective correlation of patient accounts of seizure phenomena and EEG data.

This talk will present 1) a case example of the successful utilization of a personalized aura interruption technique that was associated with a shortening of focal aware seizures. The aura interruption technique was developed during a resource-oriented and mindfulness-based intervention that employed the elicitation interview technique; 2) the results of a pilot study supporting the feasibility of high frequency monitoring of psychological states and processes in routine EMU settings. This study also investigated the correlation of quantitative EEG markers with systematic high frequency monitoring of psychological states in drug-resistant patients with epilepsy.

The approach employed in this pilot study would allow for the correlation of psychological states obtained during real-time monitoring with simultaneously obtained EEG data. This would add to our understanding of the interaction between mental, behavioral and neural correlates of the transitions between periictal, pre-ictal and early ictal states.

Talk 16

11:00, E.110

Awake in dreamless sleep: the case of lucid dreamless sleep

Adriana Alcaraz

Usually, if asked about our last night's sleep, unless we remember a dream, we are not able to report much. Dreamless sleep, the period of sleep where we are sleeping but not dreaming, has traditionally be deemed as a stage where consciousness is lost (e.g. Tononi & Koch, 2008). However, there are reasons to suspect the existence of different phenomena that could challenge this view. First, recent studies show the presence of awareness during deep sleep (Mason et al., 1997; Mason & Orme-Johnson, 2010; Dentico et al., 2016; Maruthai et al., 2016). Second, a resurgence of the study of Indo-Tibetan traditions have brought evidence of a state of awareness during sleep in absence of dreams; a period where the individual is aware of just her/his awareness but nothing else. This has led to Windt, Nielsen and Thompson (2016) to suggest a more fine-grained taxonomy of dreamless sleep experiences, including the experience of a content-less state named lucid dreamless sleep (LDS). Thus, the study of dreamless sleep phenomena has gained increasing popularity among philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists as a case study for (a) the study of sleep phenomena and (b) the study of the nature of consciousness.

My research aims at shedding light on the varieties of dreamless sleep phenomena by the implementation of an interdisciplinary program at the intersection between philosophy and

psychology. In this talk, I present the results of a pilot study where I interviewed subjects experiencing a sort of LDS. This study was carried out following the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) developed by Petitmengin (1999; 2006). I start by introducing the concept of LDS, drawing from contemplative traditions and analytical philosophy. I then present my pilot study where participants provided detailed descriptions of lucid dreams following an imagery dissolution. I present my analysis of these experiences of ‘dream dissolution’, accompanied by an experience of ‘spaceless void’ or ‘nothingness’. I end by showing the resemblances and differences between these reported experiences and the descriptions of LDS found in the literature.

While the results of my project are still preliminary, they provide two important lessons: (a) there is a wider variability of dreamless sleep phenomena than what previously thought, (b) that the MPI can help to shed light on this variability. In this talk, I stress the importance of using first-person methods such as the MPI to gather more detailed reports of subjective experiences during sleep.

Keynote 7

11:45, Audimax

Describing the experience of conscious, occurrent thinking:

A first and second person approach

Fergus Anderson



In this talk I will present a thesis about the nature of the experience of occurrent, conscious thought. The traditional view in philosophy of mind has been that there is a strong separation between the phenomenal and intentional properties of mind. Since the 1990’s various theories have challenged this orthodoxy, and one of these is cognitive phenomenology (Bayne & Montague, 2011; Chudnoff, 2015). Cognitive phenomenologists typically hold that there is a distinct ‘what it’s like’ quality to occurrently entertaining a thought, and further, that this ‘cognitive phenomenology’ is in some way constitutive of what thought essentially is. However, although there is much in the cognitive phenomenology debate that explores the properties that cognitive phenomenology must have if it is to account for thought, there is little in the way of attending to and describing the actual experience of thought. In other words, although cognitive phenomenology is a theory about the experience of thought, it lacks a descriptive phenomenology of what it’s actually like to think.

The view I will present in this talk is that something important can be added to the cognitive phenomenology debate by actually attending to the experience of thinking in the first-person sense. Drawing on micro-phenomenology for methodological support (Petitmengin, 2006; Bitbol & Petitmengin, 2013), I make a proposal about the generic diachronic and synchronic structure of thought experiences. My thesis – which I call the dynamic phenomenology of thought thesis, or DPT – is that the ‘representational state’ aspect of thought is only the final stage of what is in fact a dynamic *movement* that has four distinct stages. One implication of this is that actual instances of thought might be much less frequent than we commonly think. In the talk I will explore this and other aspects of the thesis.

Poster Presentations

How to use first person perspective to transform autoimmune diseases

Bettina Berger

Background: Type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) is an autoimmune disease whose occurrence is explained in a multifactorial manner. The disease-causing factors are not identified in individual cases. Although research indicates that stress may be relevant risk factors, they are neither individually diagnosed nor treated. Based on a single case, the relationship between stress and T1DM diagnosis and management are explored and discussed on the backgrounds of various theories.

Objective: Can one, by observing one's own behaviors (introspection), identify patterns that provide clues to disease-causing factors? Can this psychological pattern be overcome?

Methodology: A daily practice of reflecting on introspective perceptions of emotional states and blood glucose levels for insulin dose adjustment is applied as an oscillatory approach between mindful perceiving and reflective distancing. Daily blood sugar protocols as well as diary entries have been examined in relation to repetition and contradictions as bodily phenomena. Repetition of regulation and dysregulation evoked shape-like pattern. Adapted to procedures for physical illnesses, a change management strategy, Scharmer's theory U, is used to overcome emotional dysregulation pattern as a process-oriented tool.

Result: Repetition of a pattern of emotional dysregulation as well as blood sugar dysregulation could be identified. Emotional dysregulation pattern appeared to be similar to unresolved early childhood mental stress situations. How far this pattern might have contributed to a chronification of an overload of allostase and thus to a condition, which might contribute to the development of autoimmune-diseases like T1DM can be discussed. The recognition of the subjectively significant stress factors in daily life can enable the overcoming of the repetition of this emotional dysregulated pattern. For this, Scharmer's theory U, adapted to physical illness, was used as a process tool.

Discussion: Current emotional stress regulating pattern have been used to identify relationship pattern in childhood. Based on current evidence concerning stress as one possible causing factor of autoimmune diseases, the identification of individual mental stress situation in early childhood might be relevant.

Conclusion: People with stress-induced autoimmune diseases might – as was the case of this protagonist – find great comfort in being acknowledged and supported in the process of identification of their subjectively significant stressors and engaging in their transformation. In this case this also led to the hypothesis that this stress pattern may have contributed to the development of an autoimmune disease such as T1DM.

From Phenomenological Self-Givenness to the "Verticality" of Experience

Iris Hennigfeld

The phenomenological program, "Back to the things themselves!" designates a specific methodological approach toward the things and, as its final aim, toward a particular mode in which the things are given in first-person experience of a human being. One particular mode in which the things are given in first-person experience with full evidence and in original intuition is "self-givenness."

In my paper, I wish to focus on the notions of "givenness" [Gegebenheit] and "self-givenness" [Selbstgegebenheit] both in Husserl's phenomenology and in phenomenological work after Husserl. For this purpose, after giving a brief outline of Husserl's idea of "self-givenness", I wish to portray key elements of Anthony Steinbock's "generative" phenomenology after Husserl as an example for opening new fields of phenomenological research and deploying the first-person perspective in the field of phenomenology of religion and social ontology. Following the phenomenological first-person perspective, the description and analysis of experiential evidence is a main feature of Steinbock's method.

In the experience of self-givenness, the object is fully present, or in Husserl's words, given in

"originary presentive intuition." In (Husserlian) phenomenology, the experience of self-giving is the ultimate measure for each step in research and for all judgements. Self-giveness also represents the criteria of evidence and truth.

The phenomenological principles of givenness and self-giveness can be made fruitful in particular for a description and investigation of those phenomena, which, according to their very nature, resist other theoretical approaches. Presentation, i. e. the mode in which an object is given for a subject, becomes, in accordance with philosophical tradition, likewise the dominant model in phenomenological research. But first-person experience shows that presentation is not the only mode of givenness and self-giveness. Rather, pushing phenomenology to its limits, the full range of experience shows that there are certain kinds of phenomena of which the genuine mode of givenness cannot be reduced to the way in which objects are presented to a subject. These so-called "limit-phenomena" or, in Steinbock's terminology, "vertical" phenomena include, for example, the aesthetic, interpersonal, and religious dimensions of experience.

Continuing and extending Husserl's own approach, the phenomenologist Anthony Steinbock has in recent times developed a "generative phenomenology" after Husserl (cf. *Home and Beyond*, 1995) and investigated into the specific kind of givenness of these limit-phenomena (cf. *Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience*, 2007; *Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart*, 2014). Limit-phenomena are not simply phenomena, which traditionally have been excluded from philosophical discourse, but are characterized by a specific kind of evidence, namely to be given as not being able to be given. Within generativity, the "limits" can become phenomenal, and the historical, cultural, and intersubjective dimensions of experience can be revealed. Thereby, Steinbock opened the (Husserlian) criterion of self-giveness as presentation to other modes of givenness and first-person experience, through which especially those phenomena can be investigated, which are traditionally situated within the limits of phenomenal givenness as presentation.

How meditative absorption refines the phenomenological description of subjectivity

Sucharit Katyal, Stefano Poletti, and Prisca Bauer

A majority of contemporary research on meditation practices focuses on their benefits to physical and mental health, mainly through the lens of neurocognitive sciences. Many of these practices were developed, however, to attain spiritual goals through direct exploration of subjectivity via precise phenomenological instructions and procedures. To date, scientific understanding of such practices remains scarce.

In most contemplative traditions, spiritual exercises are codified, amongst other things, by the idea of making the mental experience gradually subtler. Focused attention practices are not merely tools for developing sustained attention; instead they enable the practitioner to progressively refine awareness so that it can penetrate into the "pores" of one's subjective experience. This process starts with a certain degree of "impedance," based on the embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted "thickness" of experience. With sufficient training, a practitioner gains the ability to maintain highly focal attention on a noematic content. This focal attention results in a fading of the solidity of the content, and thinning of the intentional embeddedness of one's experience. Taking Husserl's notion of epochè, the noetic aspect of intentional acts can thus become more transparent, adding a sense of familiarity yet mysteriousness to the nature of intentionality and subjectivity itself. What especially becomes more mysterious, and in turn curious as an outcome, is the constantly self-referable "I-pole" of experience.

While acknowledging what meditation has to teach us about subjective experience, the radical socio-cultural embeddedness of meditation practices should not be neglected. The interconnectedness of biological, socio-cultural, and psychological factors in meditation deconstructs pure subjectivity with "external" factors. We suggest, moreover, that through meditation, a practitioner is able to enclose, suspend, and maybe relativise extra-intentional factors as they emerge within, or together with, the enactment of subjectivity and agentivity themselves.

As such, the thinning of mental experience through meditation lends itself to novel paths for phenomenological enquiry. Micro-phenomenology represents a refined tool to access the shades of this deconstruction at the very origin of subjective experience, which can contribute to neurocognitive sciences and clinical practice.

Body experience in depression – a qualitative analysis using Focusing for a new interview approach

Naomi Lyons

Phenomenologist Thomas Fuchs (2005) describes the bodily state in depression as a corporealization. Corporealization means the feeling of a heavy and solid body that does not allow the transparent flow between self and environment anymore that exists in healthy individuals. The experience of the disorder is described in a similar fashion in individuals with depression with the use of metaphors. A psychotherapeutic treatment that explicitly targets the body experience of clients is Focusing (Gendlin, 1962). In Focusing, emotional wellbeing is reached by finding words, images or symbols that meaningfully describe someone's bodily experience. Up to now, body-related images of depression have not been examined systematically. Experiencing, the method of Focusing, might help to better understand images of body experience participants use. The question investigated in this study is therefore whether individuals with depression use consistent body-related images to describe their experiences. Additionally, categories will be formed to group the body-related images. 10 Participants with depression were interviewed with a partly standardized manual. Participants picked a situation that was typical for their personal symptomatology, went through a starting relaxation training and then through the Experiencing-related interview. Interviews were analyzed with qualitative content analysis. During the described situations, bodily sensations appeared in the trunk, especially chest and belly, head and neck as well as back and shoulders. Participants used body-related images from nine diverging categories. Most frequently used were images from category "tightness and pressure" and "paralysis and weakness". Participants feel like being encapsulated in a container, that is either their body or the self. Therefore, they feel locked from the surrounding and paralyzed. The question, whether there are consistent body-related images among individuals with depression that can be grouped into categories finds support within this study. Images deriving from body sensations show similarities with metaphors used by individuals with depression that are not explicitly related to the body. Implications will be discussed.

An Alternative Approach to Science

Mary Rees

I propose in this theoretical study a three-part alternative approach to science based in phenomenology. The method of the theoretical study includes: 1) gathering and reporting cross domain data using Arne Collen's three-part Systemic design for theoretical and philosophical studies, 2) applying a heuristic or iterative approach to analysis of coding and tables created, and 3) using "imaginative variation" of phenomenological process to narrow to essential elements for each level of science.

To support the human potential for recognizing and accessing subtle levels of awareness, I also offer two small informal investigations: People who have trained in observing subtle experience participate in first-person micro phenomenological reporting as they do a practice of noting unfolding experience and a textual study of creative process based on biography, autobiography, and interviews of individuals creating in different domains.

The study engages a replicable model with abundant potential variations. I invite others to further shared research.

**Aesthetics as a Path to Moral Judgment:
Can We Transform Our Feelings into Organs of Cognition?**

Michael Ronall

When we hear the word *research*, we think of organizing our inferences from externally observed, objective phenomena. Even when unconventionally embedded in the context of introspection, as at the present conference, the *research* component of the phrase denotes the apprehension of data, i.e., what is *given* to the observer, even when that data confront us non-physically. In contemporary intellectual discourse, claims to private revelations of reality are generally deemed unscientific; such privileged assertions are *eis ipsius* delegitimized and dismissed as superstitions. The only real objects are believed to subsist outside consciousness, or in older usage, the soul.

On the one hand, the human condition renders personal judgments inescapable and in need of being sifted out in order to wrest from our experience data valuable for the preservation or enhancement of one's own and others' lives; on the other hand, such facts, when won from our surroundings, are characteristically placed in the service of gratifying those very preferences whose judgments had first to be bracketed off in order to discern what is true in itself rather than what is true only "for me." By this route, the world itself becomes an instrument for satisfying the individual tastes that we had excluded at our initial encounter with its phenomena in order to assess objective reality and form reliable predictions about its determining influence on our preferences. The everyday epistemic-aesthetic-volitional progression that we normally follow consists in perceiving and contextualizing objects in my environment; identifying my personal likes and dislikes about them; and then acting to reduce the latter and promote the former.

But what if this sequence and the aims it pursues were not the only mode of knowing and acting in the world? Do my feelings also hold the potential to serve another function, in particular that of abstracting truth from the impressions that trigger them, and then investing my ethical impulses with comprehensively positive value? This presentation will explore the schooling of introspective observation in order to shape human feelings into organs of cognition, complementary to intellectual cognition and comparably objective and exact. Following Rudolf Steiner's suggestions for meditative practice, we would ask: Can aesthetic sensations provide accurate ontological inferences and bridge them to reliable moral guidance? Can affective experience come to tell me about the world as such and ethically evaluate the influence that I exert upon it? If so, what training would that transformation require?

First person probing into the embodied experience of somatic practicing

Stefan Marco Schneider

Phenomenology explores the general structure of experience, and one of its major insights is that experience, as it is lived-through, is embodied. Experience is both constrained by and enabled through the body, for example in the sub-personal organization of movement and perception through sensorimotor processes. It is often thought that this so-called pre-reflective dimension of experience is not directly accessible but can be illuminated by reflecting on e.g. pathological cases and intuitive examples. However, the body itself can also be experientially foregrounded, particularly when it is consciously objectified and explored in a manner similar to any other perceived object.

Practitioners of somatic practices such as Feldenkrais, Taichi, or Yoga explore and work with the subjective experience of their own moving bodies in a direct manner by employing methods that playfully and ingeniously juggle the sub-personal and personal dimensions of bodily experience (Eddy, 2009). Extended engagement with such practices allows subjects to become aware of aspects of their pre-personal movement organization, and to develop the capacity for subtle sensory discriminations as perceived from within (Ravn, 2010).

Despite the fact that each has distinctive aims and methods, it is clear that phenomenology and somatics share a significant common interest in understanding bodily experience from the first-person perspective. As a long-time practitioner of Feldenkrais and Taichi, I have become keenly aware of how personal experience with somatic practices can come to intuitively influence and inform one's philosophical research concerning the phenomenology of bodily experience. In this talk, I explore the possibility of a more systematic integration of these perspectives by arguing that somatic practicing can offer helpful conceptual and methodological resources to phenomenologists interested in bodily experience. In particular, I examine how somatics may be of value to inform phenomenology through deliberate first person probing to generate "factual variations" (Hoffding & Martiny, 2015) of the experience of the moving body.

Light trance hypnosis as a tool of introspection

Maja Smrdu

Medical hypnosis is mostly used for therapeutic purpose, however it can also be used as an investigative method. Validity of memories evoked through hypnosis (e.g. age-regression for traumatic childhood memories) can be questionable; nevertheless a hypnosis can significantly increase an amount of correctly recalled items (without the increase in false positive errors), recall accuracy and enhance imagery vividness. To achieve this, a light trance hypnosis in which co-researcher can still speak is needed, any suggestions to a co-researcher should be avoided and a co-researcher's curiosity for introspection should be present. This kind of hypnosis can be perceived as a step in the direction of micro-phenomenology, since both methods are retrospectively accessing past, single experience, for which a stabilised attention, directed to various in-depth dimensions of experience and from "what" to "how" is crucial. In this type of hypnosis, a co-researcher is, from the beginning, in the embodied speech position, and he/she apprehends experience as a personal one, congruent with other experiences.

Therefore, four cases of hypnosis, which aimed to accurate and detailed examination of experience, in situations with various emotional intensity and valence will be presented, i.e. a fall in downhill skiing accident, a gas explosion on a cargo ship and two family situations. Since we consider a light trance hypnosis as a suitable method for studying consciousness, validation criteria for each of the described experience will be conversed, as well.

Kant's Intuitive Understanding: A Phenomenological Pilot Study

Ulrich Stegmann

This talk sketches a project that seeks to employ introspective, phenomenological methods for exploring a controversial topic in the philosophy of history, mind, and science. Many philosophers have entertained the idea of a special kind of cognition, which Kant called 'intuitive understanding'. Often associated with divine cognition, intuitive understanding was deemed wholly or largely beyond human capabilities. For Kant, humans understand by means of subsuming particular objects under general concepts ("discursive understanding"), whereas God intuits the whole in all its determinations ("intuitive understanding"). Although Kant's intuitive understanding is clearly distinct from hunches and unreflective judgments, its precise nature is a matter of debate (e.g. Förster 2012). Around 1800, Goethe claimed intuitive understanding as the source of his botanical findings (Schulte 1984, Förster 2012), some of which have been corroborated at the molecular level. The corroborated findings include the phase change in foliage leaves and the serial homology between leaves and floral organs (e.g. Bowman et al. 1989, Kaplan 2000). This raises the question of whether Goethe's discoveries were indeed the product of intuitive cognition. In this talk I sketch a project that seeks to answer this question.

In reconstructing Goethe's botanical method, the project will take a novel approach. Rather than interpret his writings from a specific philosophical perspective, e.g. Kant or Spinoza, it will reconstruct

Goethe's procedure as far as possible in its own terms. Despite the sizeable secondary literature on Goethe's botany, a reconstruction of this kind is still missing. Some of the work is vague or makes selective use of Goethe's texts, and most of it focuses on scientific (e.g. Magnus 1906, Hansen 1916-19, Haberlandt 1923), historical, and ontological issues (e.g. Bortoft 1996, Breidbach 2006, Kuhn 1988, Lenoir 1990, von Engelhardt 2006). By contrast, Goethe's methodological clues about his botanical work have not received the necessary attention. My preliminary research shows that by focusing on these clues it will be possible to reconstruct key aspects of Goethe's method without substantial philosophical presuppositions.

Furthermore, the reconstructions will be sufficiently rich and reliable in order to re-enact Goethe's procedure with selected botanical examples. This is the part that requires an introspective, phenomenological approach. The re-enactment is an important part of the project because it complements the text-based research with a practical, experiential line of inquiry.

Biographies

Adriana Alcaraz

University of Glasgow

Adriana is an MPhil candidate in Philosophy at the Centre for the Study of the Perceptual Experience (CSPE) at the Philosophy Department of the University of Glasgow (UK) under the supervision of Prof Fiona Macpherson. Her research, at the intersection between philosophy and psychology, investigates the phenomenon of lucid dreamless sleep – the experience of awareness during dreamless sleep in absence of dreams. In September, she will continue as a PhD candidate as the Scottish Graduate School of Arts and Humanities (SGSAH) studentship holder at the same centre, researching on the phenomenology of different sleep states and consciousness. Parallel to her research, she is working as Project Manager for the Minimal Phenomenal Experience, led by Prof Thomas Metzinger. Prior to this, Adriana obtained a Bachelor's degree in Psychology and a Master's degree in Cognitive Science at the University of Barcelona, Spain.

Dr. Fergus Anderson

Institut für Bildung und Gesellschaftliche Innovation

Fergus did his PhD at Alanus University on the subject of the experience of thinking. He currently works for Crossfields Institute in the UK as a lecturer and programme leader and is a senior research associate at the Institut für Bildung und Gesellschaftliche Innovation in Bonn. He has also trained in the micro-phenomenology interview method and has worked extensively with meditation drawing from a range of traditions. fa@ibugi.de

Dr. Prisca Bauer

Lyon Neuroscience Research Center

Prisca Bauer is a post-doc at the Lyon Neuroscience Research Center, France. She obtained her MD from Utrecht University, The Netherlands, and her PhD in Epileptology and Neurophysiology from University College London, UK in 2016. In 2017 she was awarded a two-year Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship to study the neural correlates of mindfulness meditation and hypnosis in the team of Dr. Antoine Lutz. In addition, she is involved in developing mindfulness-based approaches to improve the quality of life in people with epilepsy. During her fellowship, she developed a strong interest in (micro-)phenomenology, and its use in scientific and clinical contexts.

Dr. Bettina Berger

Universität Witten/Herdecke

Born in 1967 in east Germany; studies of Theology and Cultural Sciences between 1986 and 1999; development, realization and evaluation of the first program in scientific competencies for medical lay persons between 2002 and 2010; Member of the chair of Medical Theory, Integrative and Anthroposophic Medicine since 2010.

Current research: development of different methods to involve patient's perspective in health care research; first person perspective as method to develop programs for patients with autoimmune diseases.

Federica Cavaletti

Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Federica Cavaletti is a PhD student in Humanities (curriculum: Communication, media and performing arts) at the Catholic University of Milan. Her doctoral project explores time perception

in movies and real life, by combining theory with empirical evidence from cognitive psychology and micro-phenomenology. Her focus gradually shifted from time perception *per se* in its different aspects to the methodological issues raised by the existing approaches used to study the time perception - as explored in the study presented here.

Prof. Dr. med. Friedrich Edelhäuser
Universität Witten/Herdecke

Prof. Dr. med. Friedrich Edelhäuser is a Neurologist and Head of Early Rehabilitation Department at the Gemeinschaftskrankenhaus Herdecke. He serves in collaborative leadership of the Integrated Accompanying Program Anthroposophic Medicine (Integrated Curriculum for Anthroposophical Medicine - ICURAM) with many student-driven and co-designed projects. Thematic focal points are the connection between perception and movement, introspection research (first-person perspective), modern activity- and team-based teaching didactics, team building, education and training questions.

Nicolas Endres
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Nicolas got his Bachelor's degree (Bsc.) in psychology from the University of the West of England in Bristol, England and his master's degree (Msc.) in "Mind and Brain" (consisting of neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology) from the Berlin School of Mind and Brain at Humboldt University, Berlin. During his studies he worked at the Max-Planck-Institute of Human Cognition and Brain science in Berlin working within the ReSource-project, a large, longitudinal study on the effects of different kinds of meditation. After completing his master's he developed and taught an experimental first-person science course at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain at Humboldt University entitled "Applying the scientific method directly to the mind".

Prof. Shaun Gallagher, PhD
University of Memphis
University of Wollongong

Shaun Gallagher is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis, and Professorial Fellow at the Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong (AU). He is also Honorary Professor of Health Sciences at Tromsø University (Norway). He held the Humboldt Foundation Anneliese Maier Research Fellow (2012-18). Publications: *Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind* (OUP, 2017); *The Neurophenomenology of Awe and Wonder* (2015); *Phenomenology* (2012); *The Phenomenological Mind* (with Dan Zahavi, 2012); *How the Body Shapes the Mind* (2005); he's editor-in-chief of the journal *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

Uni.-Prof. Dr. habil. Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch
Karl Landsteiner University of Health Sciences

Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch, Univ.-Prof. Dr. habil., is psychoanalyst as well as training and supervising analyst of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (WPV) and of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA). She is Professor of Psychotherapy Research and Head of the Division of Psychodynamics at the Karl Landsteiner University of Health Sciences in Krems as well as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. She is a member of the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (ÖAW). She is also a member of the Commission for Science Ethics as well as a member of the *Commission for History and Philosophy of Science and Humanities* of the ÖAW. She serves as Chair of the *Maimonides Lectures* as well as Speaker of the ÖAW Committee Lower Austria and Burgenland of the ÖAW. Since 2000, she is Research fellow of the IPA.

She has served as a member (2005-2012) of the *Psychoanalysis and the University Committee* of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) as well as its Co-Chair (2012-2017) until the achievement of the Committee's task.

Since 2012, she serves on the editorial boards of *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis* and *Trauma and Memory. European Review of Psychoanalysis and Social Science*. She edited *Psychoanalyse im Dialog der Wissenschaften. Bd. 1: Europäische Perspektiven und Bd. 2: Interdisciplinary Science* (2005), *Geist, Gehirn, Verhalten: Sigmund Freud und die modernen Wissenschaften* (2009) and co-edited *The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, 3 Bde.* (1993-2000), *Ferenczi's Turn in Psychoanalysis* (1996, 2000) as well as *Sensory Perception. Mind and Matter* (2012). Current main interests: First-Person-methodologies in psychotherapy research; philosophical investigations of phenomenal states of mind; history and philosophy of science (psychodynamic and psychological disciplines).

Sophie Gröning

Universität Witten/Herdecke

Sophie Gröning, born in Berlin, Germany, after completing an internship at a private practice for psychotherapy under Frank Langos in 2016, enrolled at the University of Witten/Herdecke for her Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology and Psychotherapy. Since 2017 Gröning has worked as a tutor in various courses such as behavioral neuroscience, experimental psychology, personality psychology, and social psychology.

Dr. Andrés Sánchez Guerrero

Universitätsklinikum Münster

H. Andrés Sánchez Guerrero works as a clinician at the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatic Medicine of the University Hospital Münster (Germany). His particular research interests include the philosophy of emotion, the philosophy of collective intentionality, social ontology, and the phenomenologically inspired philosophy of psychiatry. He has contributed with different papers and with his book *Feeling Together and Caring with One Another: A Contribution to Debate on Collective Affective Intentionality* to these research areas. Before returning to clinical practice, he worked in the frame of the research project 'Emotional Experience in Depression' at the Institute of Cognitive Science of the University of Osnabrück (Germany). He studied for his MSc and PhD in Cognitive Science at the University of Osnabrück, after having studied Medicine in Bogotá (Colombia) and Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Basel (Switzerland).

Dr. Christopher Gutland

Sun Yat-sen University

Christopher Gutland is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Philosophy at the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China. He studied historical anthropology, philosophy, English philology and sinology in Freiburg and Boston. His doctoral dissertation was published under the (translated) title "*Experience of Thinking. A Phenomenologically Oriented Investigation of the Experienceability of Thinking and Thoughts*". His research interests are epistemology, phenomenology and German idealism. Besides his work in Guangzhou, he is an associate editor in the *Consciousness Research* section of *Frontiers in Psychology* and involved in the international project *Phenomenological Perspectives: Cultural Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology*.

Dr. Katrin Heimann

Aarhus University

Katrin Heimann was educated in Philosophy and Culture (B.A. and M.A, University of Witten-Herdecke)

and Neuroscience (M.Sc., University of Amsterdam and PhD, University of Parma) and is currently working as Assistant Professor in the interdisciplinary research group "Interacting Minds Center" at Aarhus University, Denmark. She belongs to the team surrounding Claire Petitmengin, investing in the development of Micro-Phenomenology as an empirical method to investigate first person experience. Currently, she is exploring the method in a number of parallelly running research projects exploring psychological phenomena and the ways of investigating them reaching from time-perception to playfulness.

Dr. Iris Hennigfeld

Leuphana Universität Lüneburg

Iris Hennigfeld completed her Master of Arts in Philosophy and German Literature with a Goethe-Fellowship between 2009 and 2011 at McGill University, Montreal/Canada. In 2012 she worked a part of a Research Group at the Phenomenology Research Center at Southern University Carbondale, Illinois/USA. In 2013 and 2014 she accepted a Teaching Position at Leuphana University Lüneburg. Between 2014 and 2019 Hennigfeld worked on a PhD project titled "Goethes Thinking in the Light of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology". Her areas of Specialization are in Phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) and Goethe Studies. Her areas of Competence are in Philosophy of Religion, Classical German Philosophy, and Aesthetics. E-mail: iris.hennigfeld@stud.leuphana.de

Ole Höffken

Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn

Ole Höffken studied philosophy and history at the University of Bonn, where he also received his Master of Arts in philosophy. He has written his master thesis on the perspective of pure experience, as developed by William James and recently taken up in the context of micro-phenomenology. Currently, Höffken is writing his PhD thesis enhancing on this topic. His main interest is how pure experience may serve as a methodological perspective in (micro-)phenomenology and analytic philosophy and especially how it can be combined with formal methods, such as structural/relational description of experience (as suggested by Rudolf Carnap in 'The Logical Structure of the World').

Prof. Russell T. Hurlburt, PhD

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Russ Hurlburt is Professor of Psychology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He is widely recognized as an innovative investigator of methods for exploring inner experience. He was the first to use beepers to explore experience and behavior, inventing, in 1973, the beeper that makes such exploration possible, and was the first to undertake what is now widely referred to as "thought sampling," the random sampling of thoughts in natural environments. Since the early 1980s, he has focused his research efforts on the high-fidelity description of inner experience using a method he calls "Descriptive Experience Sampling."

Dr. Hurlburt has written six books on inner experience including *A Passion for Specificity: Confronting Inner Experience in Literature and Science* (Ohio State, 2016, with Marco Caracciolo), *Investigating Pristine Inner Experience: Moments of Truth* (Cambridge, 2011) and *Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic* (MIT, 2007, with Eric Schwitzgebel).

Dr. Sucharit Katyal

Centre de Recherche en Neurosciences de Lyon

Sucharit Katyal earned his bachelor's degree in Computer Science from the Delhi College of Engineering, INDA and his master's degree in Neuroscience from the National Brain Research Centre, India. He then went on to complete his Ph.D. in Psychology (Cognition & Perception) at the University

of Texas in Austin und Davis Res. From there Katyal worked as a postdoctoral associate at the department of psychology at the University of Minnesota between 2013 and 2016 and at the University of California, Davis between 2016 and 2017. Currently Katyal works as a postdoctoral fellow at the French National Institute of Health and Medical Research in Lyon, France.

Prof. Dr. Urban Kordeš
University of Ljubljana

Urban Kordeš is professor of cognitive science and first-person research at the University of Ljubljana where he is currently heading the Center for Cognitive Science and the graduate cognitive science program. His research interests include in-depth empirical phenomenological research, neurophenomenology, second-order cybernetics, collaborative knowledge creation, as well as epistemic and methodological issues in the research of non-trivial systems. Urban believes that training in the skill of phenomenological reflection and subsequent first-person reporting should become one of the essential cognitive science research techniques. His current research involves such training in a participatory setting of the “Observatory” research group.

Tuomas Leisti
University of Helsinki

Tuomas Leisti will defend his doctoral dissertation “From qualia to quality ratings: Subjective experience, conscious thought and how decisions are explained” at the end of this summer. He received his MA (psychology) degree from the University of Helsinki in 2005. Before his doctoral studies, he developed methods for studying experiences in the context of media technology. His doctoral dissertation concerns the interactions between subjective experience and conscious thought in judgment and decision-making. In 2019, Tuomas Leisti will start as a post-doctoral researcher in an Academy of Finland funded project about the epistemological value of photographs, concentrating on interactions between experiences and thoughts in the detection of persuasion and fake news.

Dr. Anna-Lena Lumma
Universität Witten/Herdecke

After finishing her studies in Cognitive Science at the University of Osnabrueck, Anna-Lena Lumma completed her PhD by studying the integration of first- and third-person methods in the context of a large-scale longitudinal mental training study at the Max Planck Institute in Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig. Currently, she works as a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Psychology and Psychotherapy at the University of Witten/Herdecke and is primarily interested in the development and advancement of first-person methods to study human experience.

Naomi Lyons
Universität Witten/Herdecke

Naomi Lyons works at Witten/Herdecke University since 2015 as a research assistant. She has a Master’s degree in clinical psychology from University of Osnabrueck and additionally studied Dance/Movement Therapy at SRH Heidelberg. For her PhD, she studies basic assumptions on embodied experiences in mental disorder. The theses of hyper- and disembodiment in depression and schizophrenia from phenomenologist Thomas Fuchs are the basis for empirical studies with differing psychological methodologies. Naomi teaches classes on Schizophrenia and body psychotherapy for psychology students at Witten/Herdecke University.

Kurt Mathisen

Universität Witten/Herdecke

Kurt Mathisen was born in New Jersey, USA and studied Psychology at Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania, USA. Since earning his bachelor's degree he has worked as a child educator in Heidelberg and as a child psychologist in Neurofeedback therapy and psychometrics in Neustadt an der Weinstraße. Mathisen is currently working on his master's degree in clinical psychology and psychotherapy at the University of Witten/Herdecke and is writing his Master's thesis on the Medienfasten (Media Fasting) project supervised by Dr. med. Silke Schwarz and Univ. Prof. Dr. med. David Martin. This project aims to work with families all over Germany and other parts of the world to increase self-awareness and self-control in the amount of daily screen time vs. face-to-face interaction. For more information: medienfasten.org

Dr. med. Rosa Michaelis

Universität Witten/Herdecke

Dr. med. Rosa Michaelis received her M.D. from the University Witten/Herdecke. She is currently finishing her training in psychotherapy and her residency in neurology at the Gemeinschaftskrankenhaus Herdecke. As a therapist and researcher she has a rotation position funded by the Integrated Curriculum for Anthroposophical Medicine (ICURAM) and is responsible for the ICURAM project "Selbst-Handeln bei Anfällen" ("Taking Control of Your Seizures") that is investigating the delivery of psychological interventions for people with seizures in a stepped care model. She is co-chair of the Commission "Psychosomatic Epileptology" of the Deutschen Gesellschaft für Epileptologie and chair of the "Psychology Task Force" of the International League Against Epilepsy. Rosa has been trained in the elicitation interview technique by Claire Petitmengin (Télécom ParisTech), in Synergetic Process Management by Günter Schiepek (Paracelsus Medical University Salzburg) and is dedicated to practicing yoga and meditation in the Sivananda tradition.

Dr. Katsunori Miyahara

University of Wollongong

Katsunori Miyahara is a Post-doc researcher at the School of Liberal Arts at the University of Wollongong. Before arriving in UOW in September 2018, she completed my PhD at the University of Tokyo in 2015 and continued her research at Harvard University between 2016-18. Her research interest lies in understanding how embodiment and situatedness functions in the background in perception, cognition, and action. Her current research focuses on two sets of issues: (i) Skill/habit – What is the nature of mindedness involved in skillful and/or habitual actions?; (ii) Pain – What is the nature of pain and its relation to the body? She aims to articulate the enactive structure of these experiences by drawing on insights from various philosophical traditions including phenomenology, pragmatism, and Japanese Zen Buddhism. Katsunori Miyahara is also involved in an interdisciplinary project on neurophenomenology funded by JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) with collaborators in Japan and France.

Prof. Michelle Montague, PhD

University of Texas

Michelle Montague received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder in 2002. She is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. She was previously an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Irvine from 2002-2007 and a senior lecturer at the University of Bristol from 2008-2013. She has been a visiting professor and scholar at Princeton University, MIT, ANU, the University of Copenhagen, and the University of London. Her primary interests are philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and metaphysics. Publications in

these areas include *The Given: Experience and its Content* (2016, OUP), “Perception and Cognitive Phenomenology” (2017, *Philosophical Studies*), “A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion” (2017, *The Monist*), “Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thought” (2015, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*) “Evaluative Phenomenology” (2014 in S. Roeser and C. Todd (eds) *Emotion and Value*, OUP), “The Access Problem” (2013 in U. Kriegel (ed) *Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays*, OUP), “The phenomenology of particularity” (2011, in T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds) *Cognitive Phenomenology*, OUP); “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion” (2009, *Philosophical Studies*), and “Against Propositionalism” (2007, *Nous*).

Ohad Nave

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Ohad Nave is a 2nd year MA student in Cognitive Sciences at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem studying the phenomenology of sense of boundary dissolution in meditation practitioners as part of a neuro-phenomenological research in Aviva Berkovich-Ohana lab. Trained in micro-phenomenology interview technique which facilitates access to subjective experience and allows its detailed description for the purpose of analysis and integration in a scientifically rigorous framework.

Dr. Takuya Niikawa

Institut Jean Nicod in École Normale Supérieure

Takuya Niikawa is a postdoctoral researcher at Institut Jean Nicod in École Normale Supérieure and Associate Researcher at Hokkaido University. His research interests include the nature of perceptual consciousness, the moral significance of phenomenal consciousness and neurophenomenology. He has co-edited *The Realizations of the Self* (2018) and *Representing Ourselves: Reflexive Approaches to the Function of Consciousness* (2019, a special issue of *Journal of Consciousness Studies*).

Mary Rees

Saybrook University

Mary Rees is a PHD candidate in Psychology and Interdisciplinary Inquiry (PII) at Saybrook University, San Francisco, CA. The working title of her dissertation is *The Moment of Creation: A Meta model for Opening to Constant Change and Emergent Knowing (A Phenomenological Approach to Science)*. Mary served for 20 years as a consultant and diagnostic teacher in the field of Specific Learning Disabilities, trained in a medical model at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. She has worked as a Spiritual Director and Dharma and Insight Meditation Teacher for 30 years. Her book *Being Prayer: Good News of Buddhist Practice* was published in 2004.

Pia Röttler

Universität Witten/Herdecke

Pia Röttler was born in 1996 and started studying her Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology and Psychotherapy at the University of Witten/Herdecke in 2017. She did her internship at a resident group for children and young adults. She got insights in different working methods and gained practical experiences in individual case work. Currently she works as a student assistant and volunteers as a student representative of the Department of Psychology in the Faculty of Health. Her main interests are the work fields of clinical psychology and the child and youth psychotherapy. Furthermore, Pia is part of a student group who is working on an introspection experiment about „silence“ and the consequences of silence in different situations.

Michael Ronall

Priesterseminar Hamburg der Christengemeinschaft

Michael Ronall is an American-German dual-citizen who received his MA in Philosophy from the New School for Social Research and is now completing his third and final year as a guest-student at the Priesterseminar Hamburg der Christengemeinschaft. For the past several decades he has written about, edited, and taught anthroposophical topics in various parts of the US and as a guest-instructor in China. His interests include applying epistemology to social psychology, and he has outlined a project appraising Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy in the light of Anthroposophical Spiritual Science. He is now looking for a doctoral program (suggestions welcome!) in which to write a dissertation in English.

Philipp Schmidt

Universität Wien

Philipp Schmidt studied Philosophy and Psychology. Currently, he is working on his PhD thesis on the phenomenology of selfhood at the University of Vienna. He is also a University Assistant at TU Darmstadt and the University of Würzburg.

Prof. Dr. Stefan Schmidt

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

Stefan Schmidt is Professor for Systemic Family Therapy at the Department for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psychotherapy at the Medical Centre of the University of Freiburg, Germany. He studied Psychology in Konstanz and Freiburg and received his PhD in 2002 with a thesis on distant intentionality experiments. He was appointed to an endowed chair at the University for the Humanistics at Utrecht and as Assistant Professor for Transcultural Health Studies at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder).

His research areas are at the interface of health, spirituality and consciousness, more precisely meditation and mindfulness research, placebo research as well as systemic approaches in psychotherapy.

For publications see <http://prof-stefan-schmidt.info/publikationen>

Stefan Marco Schneider

Universität Osnabrück

Stefan Marco Schneider holds an MA in Fine Arts (painting and performance) and a MSc in Cognitive Science. He is currently writing his PhD thesis on the phenomenology of movement learning and somatic practices. He gives regular seminars on this topic in his function as lecturer in Cognitive Science at the University of Osnabrück. His approach is to combine theory with practice in his research and teaching. Methodologically he integrates qualitative research with phenomenology and functional perspectives on body and mind. He also teaches the Feldenkrais method of somatic education and is a certified Tai Chi teacher. <http://whatmakesyoumove.org>; stefschn@uos.de

Assist. Prof. Dr. Maja Smrdu

University of Primorska

Maja Smrdu is a clinical psychologist, psychotherapist. She holds a phd in sport psychology. Besides her clinical work, she is a lecturer at the University of Primorska. Her research interests include first-person research (with emphasis to phenomenology of sport and meditation) and ethics in sports.

Dr. Terje Sparby
Universität Witten/Herdecke

Dr. Terje Sparby is a philosopher working at the University of Witten/Herdecke, Department of Psychology, and as a member of the ICURAP (Integrated Curriculum for Anthroposophical Psychology). Previously he has been a visiting scholar at the Humboldt University, the Mind and Life Institute and the Bender Institute of Neuroimaging. His current research focus is phenomenological and first-person methods, in particular in relation to meditation experiences.

Dr. Ulrich Stegmann
University of Aberdeen

Ulrich Stegmann is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen (UK) and works primarily in the history and philosophy of biology. After training as a zoologist, he switched to philosophy (PhD King's College London). He is the editor of *Animal Communication Theory* (2013, CUP) and author of articles on the role of informational and representational concepts in the life sciences, the discovery of biological mechanisms, and the use of diagrams and mental imagery in scientific modeling. A more recent interest concerns phenomenological investigations into mental imagery and other conscious states.

PD Dr. phil. Christian Tewes
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena

Christian Tewes is an adjunct Professor (Privatdozent) of Philosophy at the University of Jena and Principal Investigator of the Heidelberg Marsilius Project "Embodiment as Paradigm for an Evolutionary Cultural Anthropology." at Heidelberg University His research interests comprise embodiment theories, phenomenology, topics in the philosophy of mind and anthropology. He coedited the books *Embodiment in Evolution and Culture* (2016) together with Gregor Etzelmüller and *Embodiment, Enaction and Culture* (2017) with Christoph Durt and Thomas Fuchs and in 2018 with the latter the special issue on *The Formation of Embodied Memory* in the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*.
<https://www.marsilius-kolleg.uni-heidelberg.de/projekte/verkoerperung/tewes.html>

Dr. Mathis Trautwein
University of Haifa

After finishing his studies in psychology, Mathis Trautwein completed a PhD at the Max Planck Institute in Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig, where he was involved in a longitudinal study on the effects of contemplative practice on behavior, experience and neural plasticity. Supported by a fellowship of the German Research Foundation, he is currently conducting a post-doctoral research project at the University of Haifa, where he investigates minimal self-experience in meditation. More broadly, his interests focus on applying a neurophenomenological research approach to the study of the self and related social, affective and cognitive processes.

Dr. Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky
Laboratorio de Fenomenología

Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky studied biology at the University of Chile, completed a master's degree in cognitive sciences at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris and her PhD at the Université Pierre et Marie Curie in Paris. She studied circus skills and physical theater at Circomedia in Bristol, corporeal mime at the École du mime corporel dramatique in London and has been practicing Ashtanga yoga for twenty years. Among her research interests are the bodily basis of cognition, the relationship between body awareness and pain, and the development of methodologies

for the study of experience. Currently she is a researcher at the Laboratorio de Fenomenología Corporal in Chile.

Prof. Dr. Johannes Wagemann
Alanus University, Campus Mannheim

Johannes Wagemann, Dipl.-Ing., PhD, studied electrical engineering, physics, mathematics, pedagogy and philosophy in Berlin (Germany). After temporarily being engaged in digital image processing research he worked as a Waldorf schoolteacher. In 2010 he completed his PhD on a transdisciplinary approach to the mind-brain problem at University Witten-Herdecke. After being Assistant Professor for Consciousness Research at Alanus University Alfter (Germany) he moved to Alanus Campus Mannheim where he has held a full professorship of Consciousness Studies with focus on Pedagogical Anthropology since 2018. His current main interest is in developing experimental designs for first-person research on cognitive processes and in conducting studies on perception, social interaction and other related topics.

Prof. Ulrich Weger, PhD
Universität Witten/Herdecke

Since 2012 Prof. Ulrich Weger, PhD is responsible for Social Psychology and the Foundations of Psychology at the Department of Psychology and Psychotherapy at the University of Witten/Herdecke. Over the past years he has contributed towards developing the theoretical basis and the methodological foundations of a first-person science of consciousness, the self and other core psychological phenomena. Work resulting in published studies so far include projects on various themes such as memory-recall, thinking, attention, awe & wonder, mindwandering, anger, empathy and others. Historical and theoretical work is also being conducted.

Alexander Nicolai Wendt
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Alexander Nicolai Wendt (*1991), born in Göttingen, earned his MA in Philosophy and MSc in Psychology. He is currently a Research associate at the chair for Experimental and Theoretical Psychology at the University of Heidelberg (Prof. Joachim Funke). Wendt holds Lectures (Lehrauftrag) in Philosophy at the University of Rostock while writing his PhD thesis on the 'phenomenology of problems'. His research interests are in problem solving research, theoretical psychology, and phenomenological psychology.

Selected publications:


Wendt, A. N. (2018). Is there a problem in the laboratory? *Frontiers in Psychology*, 9, 2443.

Wendt, A. N. (2017). On the benefit of a phenomenological revision of problem solving. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 48(2), 240-258.

Wendt, A. N. (2017). The empirical potential of Live Streaming beyond cognitive psychology. *Journal of Dynamic Decision Making*, 3(1).

Points of Interest – Witten and the Ruhrgebiet

If you feel the need to stretch your legs, breathe some fresh air, or just want to take a stroll to digest and ponder the first-person science of consciousness, we recommend exploring the paths marked in blue below that lead to a nearby forest (about 13 minutes by foot).



Events scheduled around Witten:

- **Dido and Aeneas & Wassermusik, Ballet of Nappa (English speaking theater)**
Friday, May 24th, 2019; 19:30
Großes Haus: Elberfelder str. 65, 58095 Hagen (about 30 minutes by car from the University)
Price: 16.50 – 40.00 €/Person
- **Klavierabend (piano recital): Hélène Grimaud**
Friday, May 24th, 2019; 20:00
Konzerthaus Dortmund: Brückstr. 21, 44135 Dortmund
Price: 22.50 – 72,00 €/Person (about 30 minutes by car from Uni – or 45 minutes by public transportation)
- **Tour of a mine/colliery from former miners**
Saturday, May 25th, 2019; 14:15 – 15:45
Deutsches Bergbau-Museum: am Bergbaumuseum 28, 44791 Bochum
Price: 10€/Person; NOTE: must call in advance to make a reservation! Only 20 visitors to a group!
Contact: +49 234 5877-126 /-128 (about 30 minutes by car from Uni – or 45 minutes by public transportation)
- **Aurora – Wunderbares Polarlicht – Astronomy Show**
Saturday, May 25th, 2019; 18:00
Zeiss-Planetarium: Castroper Str. 67, 44791 Bochum

Favorite Bars and Restaurants: Night Life in Witten

- **Ratskeller Witten** (Bar and Restaurant €€): Marktstraße 16, 58452 Witten
- **Knut's** (Restaurant €€): Wiesenstraße 25, 58452 Witten
- **[...] Raum Café** (Restaurant €): Wiesenstraße 25, 58452 Witten
- **Klimbim** (Bar €): Wiesenstraße 25A, 58452 Witten
- **Old House** (Bar €€): Hinter der Evangelischen Kirche 1, 58452 Witten
- **Kronen-Eck** (Bar €): Annenstraße 105, 58453 Witten
- **Alte Post Witten** (Bar €€): Poststraße 6, 58452 Witten

Recommended parks and light hiking trails in and around Witten

- **Castle Ruin Hardenstein**
Herbede is Witten's oldest county and where the city originates. The Castle Ruins Hardenstein can be found on a light-hiking trail along the Ruhr River. There are bus routes from the inner city that can bring you directly there (Busstop: Ruine Hardenstein).
- **Stadtpark Witten (city park)**
Situated across the street from "Haus Witten", the Stadtpark is one of Witten's most visited parks and can be accessed from a variety of older neighborhoods in the Witten suburbs (Busstop: Haus Witten).
- **Hohenstein Forest**
The Hohenstein Forest is home to a petting Zoo, fallow deer, a game enclosure and a citizen tower to get a great view of the Ruhrgebiet.
- For more tourist information on Witten, culture, and places of interest: www.witten.de



Title Picture: Prof. Dr. Johannes Wagemann

Contact:

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For further information see:

<https://consciousness.uni-wh.de/>